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Abstract
This presentation proposes a new account of homology, which de-
nes homology as a correspondence of developmental or behavioral
mechanisms due to common ancestry. The idea is formally presented
as isomorphism of causal graphs over lineages. The formal treatment
not only clears the metaphysical skepticism regarding the homology
thinking, but also provides a theoretical underpinning to the concepts
like constraints, evolvability, and novelty. The novel interpretation of
homology suggests a general perspective that accommodates evolu-
tionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo) and traditional population
genetics as distinct but complementary approaches to understand evo-
lution, facilitating further empirical and theoretical researches.
Department of Philosophy, Kobe University, Rokko-dai 1-1 Nada, Kobe, Japan. Email:
junotk@gmail.com
1 Introduction
The homology thinking, the idea that the same anatomical structure repeat-
edly appears in dierent species or parts of the same organism, has a long
history in biology (Amundson, 2005). While the existence of such anatomi-
cal similarities among or within species is now explained by the descent from
a common ancestor, the conceptual issues surrounding the notion have in-
vited philosophical as well as methodological debates and skepticism. Owen
famously dened homology as \the same organ in dierent animals under ev-
ery variety of form and function," but this denition is perplexing rather than
enlightening: what characterizes and warrants the sameness of \organs," if
not their form or function? What, in other words, is the unit of homology?
There are three conceptual problems. The rst and foremost problem is
its denition: what exactly is homology? Evolutionary theory tells us that
homology is identity due to a common origin, but an identity of what? Is
it morphological characters, activities, clusters of properties, or genetic net-
works that are regarded to be same? And what is the criterion to judge
whether or not two such things are actually the \same"? The second prob-
lem is metaphysical. As Ghiselin (1997) points out, the homology-as-identity
partitions the whole tree of life into equivalence classes. But doesn't the sup-
position of such universal classes, reminiscent of Aristotelian essence, commit
us to an anti-evolutionary thinking? And thirdly, there is a pragmatic ques-
tion: why do we care about homology at all? Some neo-Darwinians such
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as G. C. Williams see homologs as mere \residues," i.e. a relic of the past
common ancestry not yet washed out by natural selection (Amundson, 2005,
pp. 237-8). If that is the case homology by itself would have no explanatory
role in evolutionary theory, and the quest for its denition, however well-
dened and metaphysically sound, becomes a mere armchair exercise with
no scientic value.
There is at least one usage of the concept free from these issues: homology
of DNA sequences. Here the \sameness" is well-dened by matching bases
that can be one of the four chemical kinds, G, C, T, A. Moreover, the scien-
tic importance of orthologs and paralogs is undeniable in reconstructing the
evolutionary history and predicting gene function, to name a few. Things
become dierent for phenotype, in particular complex phenotypes like mor-
phological or behavioral traits. First of all, there is no clear-cut denition of
\phenotypic units" as that for nucleotides. Continuous traits such as height
or weight usually lack objects breakpoints by which we classify them into
discrete equivalence classes. In sum, there seem to be no non-arbitrary and
non-controversial units for phenotype of which we can talk about the same-
ness, and thus homology.
Our rst task, therefore, is to identify the units on which the pheno-
typic homology relationship can be dened. This presentation proposes that
this purpose is best served by causal graphs which formally represent de-
velopmental or behavioral mechanisms. Homology is thus dened as graph
isomorphism over lineages, or conservation of the underlying causal structure
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over evolutionary history (Section 2). I will argue in Section 3 that the for-
mal treatment of homology (i) solves the philosophical as well as empirical
puzzles and criticisms regarding the homology concept; (ii) provides clear
meanings to some key but elusive concepts such as constraints, evolvabil-
ity, and novelty; (iii) and suggests a broad perspective that accommodates
evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-Devo) and traditional population
genetics as distinct but complementary research projects. Section 4 compares
the present approach to other existing accounts of homology, and discusses
its relative strengths, challenge, and philosophical implication. As will be
stressed there, the primary objective of this presentation is to facilitate or
open up new empirical as well as theoretical questions. The last section con-
cludes with some of these research prospects that are prompted by the new
homology concept.
2 Dening homology with graphs
The idea of characterizing homology in terms of causal structures is not
new. Various biologists have suggested, albeit in dierent fashions, that the
developmental or behavioral mechanisms underlying phenotype can or should
serve as a unit of homology (e.g. Riedl, 1978; Wagner, 1989, 2014; Gilbert
and Bolker, 2001; Muller, 2003). These proposal, however, are mostly based
on independent examples or qualitative descriptions, and the lack of a unied
treatment has blurred their philosophical as well as theoretical implications.
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The aim of this section is to give a formal representation to the ideas of
developmental sameness by using causal graphs, in view of exploring the
conceptual nature of homology in the later sections.
A causal graph G is a pair (V;E), where V is a set of phenotypic or
genetic variables of organisms and E is a set of edges representing causal
relationships among these traits. Development is understood as a causal web
connecting embryological, morphological, and behavioral traits, and the set
of edges E characterizes these causal links. Note that such connections may
remain invariant even under considerable modications in phenotypic values
or the functional form that determines the quantitative nature of each edge.
The same set of E is consistent with a variety of phenotypic states and forms
of causal production; it only denes the qualitative feature of the causal
networks, i.e. which causes which.
Once modeled in this way, it becomes meaningful to compare causal struc-
tures of dierent organisms. A causal graph G1 = (V1;E1) is isomorphic
to another G2 = (V2;E2) if they have the same structure, or more for-
mally if there is a bijection f : V1 ! V2 such that if (v; w) 2 E1 then
(f(v); f(w)) 2 E2. Likewise, isomorphism can be dened for subgraphs,
which are just parts of the causal graphs restricted to a subset V0  V. We
write G1  G2 if two (sub)graphs are isomorphic. It is easy to see `' is
symmetric, reexive, and transitive, and thus denes a equivalence class.
Each individual is assigned one causal graph that models a particular
part of its developmental or behavioral mechanism. Let us denote the causal
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structure of an organism a by G(a). Collectively, G(A) is a set of causal
structures for a set of organisms A. We assume usual ancestor/descendant
relationships over a set of organism 
 (which may include more than one
species). If b is an ancestor of a, the lineage between b and a is a set of every
individual between them. Given this setup homology is dened as follows.
For two sets of organisms A;B  
, let G 0 be a subgraph of all
g 2 G(A), and G 00 be a subgraph of all g 2 G(B). Then G 0 and
G 00 are homologous i
1. G 0  G 00;
2. there is a set of common ancestors C  
 of A and B1; and
3. for every d in all the lineages from C to A and C to B, G(d)
has a subgraph G 000 such that G 000  G 0  G 00.
The denition explicates the idea that homology is the identity between
causal structures due to common ancestry. Two (sets of) organisms share
a homologous causal structure if, in addition to the graph isomorphism, ev-
ery individual on the lineage connecting them shares the same causal graph,
capturing the idea that the structure has been conserved through the evolu-
tionary history.
The same treatment applies to serial homology, i.e. the homology re-
lationship among parts of the same organism, such as teeth, limbs, or tree
1Note that C may be A or B themselves. Also note the condition 1 is redundant if a
lineage includes the both ends. But here it is retained for clarity.
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leaves. We can just set A = B, and compare dierent but isomorphic sub-
parts G 0;G 00 of the same overall structure G(A). Then the homology hy-
pothesis is that there is an organism c in which the mechanism in question
was duplicated, and the lineages from c to A have conserved the duplicated
structures.
The above denition is illustrated with a case of special homology in gure
1, which depicts a particular region of the tree of life for (groups of) organisms
A to G. Two mutationsM1;M2 on the developmental mechanism occurred in
the lineage leading to F , in which one causal edge V1 ! V3 was rst removed
and then restored. In this example, the causal structure G(D) of population
D is homologous to G(E), for they are both inherited from the ancestral graph
G(B) and G(A). In contrast, it is not homologous to G(F ) even though they
are graph-isomorphic. This is because the lineages connecting D and F do
not conserve the causal structure in question: particularly it is not shared
by C.
The example, though too simplistic to capture any real biological phe-
nomena, makes explicit the idea that homology is a concordance of devel-
opmental mechanisms due to common ancestry. Note the criterion makes
no reference to the resulting phenotype represented by particular values or
distributions of variables. It does not require or forbid that, for example, two
populations E and D show similar morphological distributions. Nor does it
assume the graphs consist of the variables of the same nature. If the causal
graphs in gure 1 represent a genetic network, kinds of genes/variables that
7
AB
C
D
E
F
G
∗
M1(V1 ̸→ V3)
∗
M2(V1 → V3)
Genealogy Causal graphs
V3
V2 V1
V3
V2 V1
Figure 1: Illustration of graph homology. On the left is a genealogy tree for
hypothetical populations A;B;C;D;E; F;G, while the graphs on the right
describe causal structures of these populations over three characters, V1; V2,
and V3. Two asterisks () on the tree denote mutation events on the causal
structure. See text for explanation.
constitute the network may vary across populations, as long as they serve the
same causal roles within the overall structure. It is structural, rather than
material, identity that denes homology. Theoretical as well as philosophical
implications of this view will be explored in the following sections.
3 Conceptual advantages of the view
The above account is intended to provide a theoretical platform to formulate
and evaluate hypotheses or explanations regarding homology. This section
explicates the conceptual benets of thinking homology in terms of causal
graphs. Discussions on the empirical adequacy are diered to the next sec-
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tion.
As discussed in the introduction, the major obstacle in dening homology
is the absence of denite phenotypic units. Homology is an identity rather
than similarity relationship (e.g. Ghiselin, 1997; Muller, 2003; Wagner, 2014),
whereas no two or more phenotypic characters are identical in a strict sense
| there are always subtle dierences in, say, shape or size. The problem
could be solved if we could nd a natural and non-arbitrary way to factorize
the phenotypic space into discrete regions so that two phenotypes within the
same region are regarded \identical" despite their apparent dierences. This
is a dicult task, especially because we do not know the topological feature
of the phenotypic space (Wagner and Stadler, 2003). To solve this issue the
present analysis adopts a dierent strategy: instead of trying to impose a cer-
tain structure on the phenotypic space, it takes the generative mechanisms as
basic units. Once these mechanisms are represented by causal graphs, which
by nature are discrete mathematical entities, the desired identity relation-
ship is given by graph isomorphism regardless of dierences in the resulting
morphology/phenotype. The graphical representation thus provides natural
units prerequisite to dene homology.
It is granted that a graph representation is not determined uniquely, be-
cause the same developmental mechanism can be modeled in various levels of
abstraction, yielding causal graphs of dierent complexities. However, I take
this to be a strength rather than weakness of my view, because homology
too is often treated as description-dependent. Teleost ns and tetrapod limbs
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are said to be homologous as paired vertebrate appendages, but not as ns
or limbs. In contrast, our hands and pectoral ns of the whale are homol-
ogous not only as appendages but also as limbs. One tempting hypothesis
is that such degrees of homology relationship correspond to isomorphisms of
causal structures described at dierent granularities. In the above example,
it is hypothesized that teleost ns and tetrapod limbs are represented by the
same, but rather course-grained, causal graph, while tetrapod species share
the causal structure to much ner details.
Fixing the level of abstraction determines not only the equivalent classes
but also the degree of similarity between these classes. Two distinct causal
graphs may be closer or further depending on the number of changes required
to obtain one from the other. If G 00 is obtained by removing one edge from G 0
which in turn lacks one of the edges of G, G 00 is one step further than G 0 from
the original G. Each such deletion or addition of causal connection is called
novelty. Novelty in this framework is a modication of the causal graph, and
as such creates a new equivalence class of causal graphs, namely homology.
Evolutionary novelty also comes in dierent degrees. In general, a single
modication in abstract graphs will correspond to multiple edge additions
or deletions in detailed ones, and thus is weighted more. In this regard a
change in the causal graph shared both by teleosts and tetrapods will count
as a signicant novelty and possibly a creation of a new \bauplan."
This brings us to one of the central contentions in today's evolutionary
biology, namely the alleged inadequacy of the Modern Synthesis framework,
10
in particular population genetics, to incorporate macro-scale evolutionary
phenomena uncovered by evolutionary developmental biology (e.g. Pigliucci
and Muller, 2010). It has been claimed that homology (macro-scale conser-
vatism) and novelty (a large phenotypic change) not only resist explanations
by the Neo-Darwinian gradualism, but also constrain evolutionary trajec-
tories as modeled in population genetics (e.g Amundson, 2005; Brigandt,
2007). The theoretical relationship between Evo-Devo and population ge-
netics, however, remains elusive, which makes dicult to evaluate the call
for the \new synthesis."
The present approach, by expressing homolgy and novelty in terms of
graph equivalence and modication, suggests a perspective on this connec-
tion and a way to turn these claims into empirical hypotheses. Because causal
models induce evolutionary changes as studied in population and quantita-
tive genetics (Otsuka, 2015, 2016), the graphical representation allows one to
analyze how developmental structures generate and constrain evolutionary
dynamics. In particular, topological features of the graph such as modularity
yield, via the so-called Markov condition, patterns of probabilistic indepen-
dence on the phenotypic distribution and determine possible evolutionary
trajectories or evolvability. The causal graph approach thus supports the
view that a homolog constitutes a unit of morphological evolvability (Brig-
andt, 2007).
The graph structures that yield population dynamics are usually not
study objects of population genetics. They rather serve as background frame-
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works in which evolutionary models are build to study changes in genetic or
phenotypic frequencies. These frameworks, however, must come from some-
where, and this evolutionary process is a primary interest of Evo-Devo. Stud-
ies on homology and novelty | graph stasis and change | amount to \higher
order" evolutionary analyses that deal with changes in the theoretical frame-
work used in population genetics to predict local population dynamics. The
graphical conception of homology thus suggests a broad perspective that ac-
commodates these dierent, and sometimes seen antagonistic, research elds
as complementary approaches to understand evolution.
Finally, let us turn to the metaphysical problem. As seen above, homol-
ogy is dened as an equivalence class over a set of causal graphs. But to
what do such classes correspond, if not some ideal types or essences? Ho-
mology thinking has been criticized as anti-evolutionary due to its alleged
commitment to essentialism. These critics thus re-interpret homology as a
lineage that connects individual parts, rather than as a universal class to be
instantiated by its members/homologs (e.g. Ghiselin, 1997). A detailed ex-
amination of this criticism must await another occasion, but here I just want
to propose a dierent way to look at the issue. A metaphysical implication
from the present study is that homology stands to concrete parts of organ-
isms not as a universal to individuals, nor as a whole to parts, but rather as a
model to phenomena to be modeled. A homology hypothesis is based on an
observation that two or more individuals or parts thereof can be modeled by
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the same causal graph.2 Hence the proper relationship is not instantiation or
mereology, but representation (Suppes, 2002). Once conceived in this way,
the metaphysical ghost of essentialism vanishes away. Just like the same
oscillator model characterizes various kinds of pendulum clocks, homology-
as-model is a mathematical entity (directed graph) that may represent more
than one actual individual, but that does not force us to commit to any form
of essentialism.
The individual-universal distinction has also cast a shadow on the prag-
matic issue regarding the epistemic role and signicance of the concept of
homology. It has been argued that the study of homology cannot be any
more than a historiography since there is no such thing as a law for in-
dividuals (Ghiselin, 1997). A very dierent picture, however, emerges from
the present thesis. A homology statement is a historical hypothesis regarding
causal isomorphism| that two or more (sets of) organismal parts can be rep-
resented by the same causal model | and as such makes various predictions.
For example, it supports extrapolations from model organisms, predicting
that homologous organs will respond in the same or similar fashion to phys-
iological, chemical, or genetic interventions. In addition, since isomorphic
developmental structures will generate similar patterns of phenotypic vari-
ation (see above), their evolutionary changes are expected to follow similar
trajectories. Establishing homologous relationships therefore is not a mere
2This, in turn, implies these individuals would respond in a more or less same fashion
to hypothetical interventions (Woodward, 2003). Hence homology statements eventually
boil down to counterfactual claims.
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historical description, but has predictive implications both on physiological
and evolutionary studies.
4 Comparisons and possible objections
This section compares the present proposal with some of the existing ac-
counts of homology and also discusses possible objections. A number of
philosophers and biologists have recently proposed to dene homology as a
homeostatic property cluster, a cluster of correlated properties maintained by
\homeostatic mechanisms" (e.g. Boyd, 1991; Rieppel, 2005; Brigandt, 2009;
Love, 2009). Since clustering and correlations are a matter of degree, homol-
ogy according to this view is not an identity but a similarity relationship. It
thus confronts with the boundary problem | to what extent properties must
be clustered to form a homolog? The underlying \homeostatic mechanism"
is supposed to clarify this boundary, but without a clear denition of what
it is such an attempt only leads to a circularity. In particular, if it is dened
as \those causal processes that determine the boundary and integrity of the
kind (Brigandt, 2009, p.82)," the charge of circularity cannot be avoided.
This kind of problem will not arise if the generative mechanisms are de-
ned explicitly in terms of causal graphs. While my approach proposes a
formal framework to represent these mechanisms, it does not make any as-
sumption or restriction on their structure: in particular it does not require
the mechanism to be homeostatic, circumventing the criticism that a home-
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ostatic mechanism by denition cannot evolve (Kluge, 2003). Moreover, the
reference to \clusters" or even properties becomes superuous, because the
variational properties of phenotype are mere derivatives of the underlying
causal graph. Of course, covarying traits suggest some ontogenetic connec-
tions, and thus may serve as a useful heuristics for nding homologs. They
are, however, only \symptoms" | what dene homology are not properties,
clustered or homeostatic, but rather generative mechanisms.
The present approach has a closer anity to the so-called biological ho-
mology concept that attempts to explain the phenomena of homology on the
basis of a particular feature of the underlying causal structure, such as gene
regulatory networks (e.g. Wagner, 1989, 2014). Indeed, one motivation of
this presentation is to give a formal platform for these empirical hypotheses
to elucidate their theoretical as well as philosophical implications. An impor-
tant empirical challenge to the biological homology concept, and any other
attempts to identify a homolog with a certain developmental structure, is the
well-known fact that morphological similarity does not entail developmental
sameness (Wagner and Misof, 1993). It has been reported that apparently
homologous characters in related species may develop from dierent genes,
cell populations, or pathways | the phenomena called developmental system
drift (True and Haag, 2001). Although these phenomena present a challenge
to my account as well, not all of them count as counter evidence. If, for
example, \drift" concerns only genetic or cell materials, topological features
of the causal network may remain invariant. Descriptive levels also matter.
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Even if two causal structures dier at a ne-grained description, they may
coincide at a more abstract level. Finally, my view does not require the en-
tire developmental system to be conserved: if causal graphs share some part,
they may still be homologous in that aspect. Indeed, it would be surprising if
two apparent homologs turn out to share no developmental underpinnings at
all. Some degree of exibility may be expected, but so is inexibility. Rep-
resenting and comparing homologs in terms of the underlying causal graphs
will serve as a heuristics to identify which part of the overall developmental
system is responsible for generating similar morphological patterns.
From a philosophical perspective, a distinguishing feature of my account
is its explicit reference to models. Homology has traditionally considered to
be a relationship among concrete biological entities or properties thereof: it
is organs or phenotypic features that are said to be homologous. In contrast,
homology in my view is a relationship among abstract entities, i.e. causal
graphs. How and why does such an abstract relationship reveal anything
interesting about the concrete evolutionary history? That scientic theories
and concepts should directly describe actual phenomena is a predominant
view of science both in lay and scholarly circles. Under this conception
logical positivists made it their primary task to dene theoretical terms by
the observable. In the same vein philosophers of biology have tried (not
successfully in my view) to justify the concepts like homology or species by
identifying necessary and sucient conditions in terms of visible or directly
veriable features of organisms.
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This apparently intuitive picture, however, has been criticized to be an
overly simplistic view on the relationship between a scientic theory and
reality (e.g. Suppes, 1967; Cartwright, 1983; Suppe, 1989). According to the
critics the primary referents of scientic theories, concepts, and laws are not
actual phenomena but idealized models. These models are not exact replicas
of reality, but extract only certain features that are supposed to play essential
roles in the scientic problem at hand. The present analysis is in line with this
tradition. Causal graphs are highly idealized and thus possibly incomplete
representations of complex causal interactions in living systems, but it is this
idealization that aords explanatory power and general applicability. That
is, on the condition that a model extracts the common causal structure of a
population can it be used to predict the population's evolutionary trajectory
or consequences of hypothetical interventions.
Most of these models, however, are still idiosyncratic to particular popula-
tions | e.g. population geneticists usually build, customize, or parameterize
their model for each study object.3 Homology thinking aims at even higher
generality: its core idea is that some distinct species or organs allow for the
same treatment/model in the analyses of their evolutionary fate or physiolog-
ical performance. A homology statement is a historical hypothesis as to why
such a unied explanation is possible at all. That is, it justies the use of the
same causal model based on evolutionary history, i.e. by the descent of the
3Models of adaptive evolution, however, may be extrapolated to the same or similar
environmental conditions. In this regard, the analogical thinking and homological thinking
represent two distinct ways to generalize evolutionary models.
17
causal graph from common ancestry. Hence homology is far from \residual,"
but has a signicant explanatory value in biology | it allows an extrapo-
lation of an evolutionary or physiological model to other contexts, and thus
provides a basis for the highest-level generality in biological sciences.
5 Conclusion
The concept of homology presupposes phenotypic units on which identity
relationships can be dened. The present analysis identied these units with
causal graphs representing developmental or behavioral mechanisms and de-
ned homology as graph isomorphism over lineages. The advantage of this
formal concept is that it acknowledges the distinctive role of the study of ho-
mology while suggesting its connection to the traditional population genetics
framework. That is, it not only provides denite meanings to such con-
cepts like constraints, evolvability, and novelty, but also presents homology
as a historical account or justication of the generalizability of evolutionary
or physiological models. This is paralleled with the shift in the ontological
nature of what can be said to be homologous: homology is a relationship
between theoretical models, rather than concrete biological entities such as
organs. Hence the proper relationship between homology to actual biological
phenomena is not instantiation, but representation. Once conceived in this
way the metaphysical problem of the alleged essentialism fades away.
The new account of homology prompts empirical, theoretical, and philo-
18
sophical researches on various topics, including the study of novelty and
evolvability, the interplay between Evo-Devo and population genetics, im-
plications of developmental exibility, and the generalizability of biological
models, to name a few. Another interesting philosophical question not men-
tioned above is the possibility of extending the current approach to another
vexing concept in evolutionary biology, namely species. If homology is a par-
tial matching of the causal structures between distinct species, it is tempting
to dene species by the whole causal structure | so that two organisms
belong to the same species if their entire ontogeny and life history are rep-
resented by the same causal graph. This is a big question that requires an
independent analysis, but will be briey discussed in the presentation if time
permitted.
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